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Does a liberalized postal market need a sector specific regulator?
Abstract
For different reasons, most actors in liberalized postal markets call for sector specific regulatory bodies.
However those should disappear over time along with an increasingly market-oriented definition of
universal services.
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P O S T A L   
Does a l iberalized postal market need  
a sector specif ic regulator? 
S 
ector specific regulation in the postal sec-
tor has rarely been questioned so far. 
However, with the total opening of the 
European market now foreseen between 2011 
and 2013, and in some countries already in 
place, we should think again.  
To recall the context, specific regulation in 
the postal sector is an invention of the Euro-
pean Community back in 1997. The regula-
tion was a copy of what at that time had al-
ready been set up for the telecommunications 
sector. Indeed the Postal Directive (97/67/
EC) required every member country to set up 
a postal regulator. The regulator’s main func-
tions were: firstly to make sure the Universal 
Service Obligation (USO) and corresponding 
quality criteria are fulfilled; and secondly to 
watch on possible cross-subsidies resulting 
from the monopoly, which in turn was de-
signed as a means to finance the USO.  
 
Abolition of postal monopoly 
With the new Postal Directive of the Euro-
pean Community (2008/6/EC), the monop-
oly will be abolished in 2011 with exceptions 
granted to some member countries in 2013. 
Finland, Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom have already abolished (at least de 
jure) their monopoly protection, while the 
Netherlands delayed full market opening be-
cause of continuing barriers to entry in Ger-
many. Outside the European Union, Switzer-
land might open its postal market completely 
to competition by 2012, while Canada thinks 
on deregulating outbound mail. 
Against this background, cross-subsidies as a 
reasoning of regulation disappears as soon as a 
postal market is opened fully to competition. 
The issue is more subtle in terms of USO. 
While European Commission’s definition of 
USO stated in the First Framework Directive 
remains valid, many countries have in turn 
allowed for substantial flexibility when it 
comes to delivering it, namely in terms of 
products required, pricing, quality standards 
or accessibility to post office networks. By 
doing so, many incumbents such as Sweden’s 
Posten AB have found ways and means to 
fulfill USO without having the historical costs 
associated with it. This, of course, was a neces-
sity given that the monopoly protection to 
finance this USO was going to disappear.  
Much could still be done in terms of rede-
fining a USO that is adapted to the communi-
cation needs of the modern citizens. Nonethe-
less most countries have implicitly and some-
times explicitly adapted the USO to the new 
financial situations of the incumbents, which 
in turn have learned to provide the USO in a 
commercially viable way. In other words, the 
very raison d’être of traditional sector specific 
postal regulation—that is, cross-subsidies 
resulting from monopoly protection and the 
guarantee of a historically defined USO—have 
now vanished, and so should sector specific 
regulation. The world’s leading example is the 
deregulated postal market of New Zealand. It 
lacks a postal regulatory body as well as price 
regulation, whereas the (market oriented and 
the self-financing) universal service is ensured 
by a loose Deed of Understanding, a contract 
between New Zealand Post and the govern-
ment.  
Some actors and interests, however, are in 
favor of perpetuating sector specific postal 
regulation, not the least the postal regulators 
themselves, along with competitors, some-
times incumbents, and the numerous consult-
ing firms which have made sector specific 
regulation their business model.  
 
The lack of competition 
The most often used argument for sector spe-
cific regulation today is the lack of competi-
tion in the mail letter market. It is indeed true 
that despite partial or even total market open-
ing incumbents maintain market shares of 85 
per cent or sometimes above 95 per cent in 
the letter market. However, in economics, 
measures such as market shares do not reflect 
the degree and effectiveness of competition, as 
the results on contestable markets indicate.  
Even so, many actors take the viewpoint 
that sector specific regulation is needed for 
two reasons. The first argument states that 
market distortions in the form of hidden sub-
sidies (such as exemptions from value added 
tax (VAT) for historical operators) or structural 
disadvantages remain. The second argument 
says that the postal delivery network can be 
equated to a monopolistic bottleneck, analo-
gous to electricity distribution network for 
example. Therefore access to this network 
should be granted to the competitors for com-
petition to emerge. The United Kingdom has 
become the first and so far single example of 
access regulation. Needless to say that such 
access regulation requires a strong regulator. 
 
Incomparable postal sector 
The fact of the matter, however, is that the 
postal sector cannot be compared to railways, 
telecoms or electricity. There are no such 
monopolistic and physical bottlenecks involv-
ing large sunk costs as railway tracks, under-
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ground cables or electricity grids to which 
access has to be regulated. And as access regu-
lation in those network industries is the justifi-
cation for sector specific regulation, there is no 
reason for a sector specific regulation either. 
However this does not imply that there are no 
impediments to competition.  
As a matter of fact, the specialized literature 
has identified two main such impediments, 
namely postal boxes on the one hand and 
address changes on the other. It is generally 
agreed today that for competition in the postal 
market to work, competitors should be al-
lowed to access postal boxes and made avail-
able address changes, which historically only 
the incumbent had. However these two inter-
connection issues do not justify sector specific 
regulatory institutions, as access to both postal 
boxes and address changes should before all be 
negotiated against a few basic principles as laid 
down in legislation. If a competitor feels dis-
criminated by the incumbent, the competition 
regulator is well equipped to handle such 
issues.  
This is also the case for negotiated access 
agreements to the incumbent’s postal net-
work. Indeed, in many countries, competitors 
negotiate with the incumbent for the usage of 
its network, for instance transportation or 
delivery services. Again, if one competitor feels 
discriminated, the competition regulator is 
well equipped to handle the issue and no sec-
tor specific regulation is necessary. Interest-
ingly the most successful competitors do not 
rely on access at all. Instead they have built up 
their own collection, sorting and delivery 
networks. Note that in contrast to other net-
works, postal networks are the very product 
itself. (One can even argue that the only 
physical networks used by posts are streets 
which are free of charge).  
As for other market distortions such as 
asymmetric VAT exemptions (favoring the 
incumbent) or labor conditions (favoring 
generally the competitors because of the in-
cumbents stranded costs or asymmetric labor 
market regulations), these are bound to disap-
pear over time. Indeed the most significant 
market distortion till today, VAT, is generally 
tied either to the monopoly protection, or to 
the USO. In the first case, it will disappear 
along with the monopoly such as in Switzer-
land. In the latter case, VAT exemption is a 
hidden subsidy for the provider of the USO so 
as to make USO provision more attractive. On 
the European level, this distorting measure 
was not eliminated by the new directive. 
Member states such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and Italy continue to grant a 
VAT privilege to their historic operators. How-
ever it would be wrong to compensate such 
advantages by other, new regulatory distor-
tions. Instead the original distortion has to be 
tackled directly.  
In short, with the total liberalization of the 
postal sector, it is only natural that the sector 
specific regulator—which may well have been 
needed in a transition phase—should disap-
pear over time along with an increasingly 
market oriented definition of universal postal 
services.   
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